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1. Introduction 
The economics of the civilian uses of nuclear energy, --- that is to say the economics 
of nuclear power generation in which its civilian uses has been virtually limited to 
power generation--- has been the focus of much public discussion both internationally 
and domestically here in Japan. The reasons are that there are many underlying factors 
which determine the economics of power generation methods and that various 
assumptions can be made concerning these factors. In addition, the value of these 
factors will change over time and thus entail considerable uncertainties.   
Although there are many aspects to the economics of nuclear power generation, in 
its narrowest sense, it refers to the power generation costs of nuclear power plants and 
other arguments from other aspects can be summarized in terms of power generation 
costs. Therefore, this paper will focus on power generation costs at nuclear power 
plants. 
In this paper, I will introduce an outline of the economic evaluation of nuclear 
power generation by the Japanese Government, and describe its features by comparing 
this evaluation with an evaluation by the United States Government, and then point 
out what policy implications these economic evaluations have on nuclear power 
generation.  
 
2. Economic Evaluation of Nuclear Power Generation by the Japanese Government 
The profitability of nuclear power generation overall was analyzed and evaluated 
by the Cost Examination Subcommittee of the Electric Utilities Subcommittee which is  
part of the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy, an advisory body to 
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in Japan. Even though the 
analysis and evaluation of their report on January 23, 2004 has become a little 
out-dated, I will cover the content as it is the latest analysis by the Japanese 
Government. IEEJ: April 2009 
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In this analysis and evaluation, the power generation costs are calculated not as 
the costs of the power plants that are actually in operation, but as the costs of model 
plants assumed to starting operations during the same period as in other similar 
analyses and evaluations. The costs that it uses have been calculated upon set 
preconditions. The analysis was carried out as a way to verify the cost calculations by 
Japanese electric utilities.   
 
The following is a detailed outline of the electric utilities’ cost calculations.   
(1) Model plant 
In principle, the power plants which satisfied the following conditions were selected 
and their average values were used.   
a)  Year of commencement of operations: Power plants that stared operations between 
fiscal 1999 and fiscal 2003 
b)  Capacity: Hydroelectric power 10,000~20,000kW, Coal thermal power 0.6~1.05 
million kW, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) thermal power 1.44~1.52 million kW, Oil 
thermal power 350.000~500,000kW, Nuclear power 1.18~1.36 million kW 
However, when the number of plants meeting these conditions was too small, those 
plants which had commenced operations recently out of those targeted at the time of the 
previous government analysis in 1999 were also included. Moreover, the power plants 
selection was designed in such a way as to avoid partiality to specific electrical power 
suppliers.  
 
(2) Economic indicators 
a)    Exchange rate: 121.98 yen/US$ (average rate in fiscal 2002) 
b)    Price of fuel: Average price in fiscal 2002 for the first year. 
Oil: US$27.41/b, LNG: 28,090 yen, Coal: US$35.5/t 
The rate of increase in the fuel prices for oil, LNG and coal was 
calculated based on the latest values from the IEA’s "World Energy 
Outlook". 
 
(3) Operational period 
Calculated on 40 years of operations to see its long-term economy, it also calculated 
its statutory useful life (16 years for nuclear power, 15 years for thermal power, 40 years 
for hydroelectric power) to see actual costs from the viewpoint of private company 
management. 
 IEEJ: April 2009 
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(4) Capacity factor 
Cost calculations were made using assumed capacity factors of 70% and 80% for 
thermal power based on its comparison with nuclear power. In addition, capacity  
factors for various power sources (45% for hydroelectric power, 30% for oil thermal, 60% 
for LNG thermal power and 85% for nuclear power) were also assumed based upon their 
past performance for capacity factor.   
 
(5) Discount rate 
The "Discount rate" is an interest rate used in which the future value is discounted 
from the present value in order to evaluate long-term investment efficiency. This rate is 
calculated in five stages (0%, 1%, 2%, 3%, and 4%).   
 
(6) Nuclear fuel costs 
A conversion is made from the costs and the amounts of fuel processed concurrently 
each fiscal year from which the unit price per ton of nuclear fuel is calculated. The 
acquisition unit price of uranium fuel is calculated total purchases between fiscal 
2000~2002. As for the reprocessing of spent fuel, it is assumed that it will be 
reprocessed after eight years have passed since the nuclear reactor loadings and that it 
will be reprocessed after 50 years in interim storage. The regeneration rate of 
next-generation nuclear fuel by reprocessing the spent fuel is assumed to be 15%. Both 
the equalized unit price of a 40 year operational period and the equalized unit price at 
the operational period of statutory useful life (16 years) are calculated for the 
reprocessing and mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication just like with nuclear reactors. 
 
(7) Calculation results 
Though the numerical results of all cases are shown in the official report, the 
calculation results for the 3% discount rate are shown here for the sake of 
simplification.  
The nuclear fuel cycle cost was provisionally calculated as 1.47 yen/kWh for 40 
years operation, and 1.66 yen/kWh for 16 years operation.   
Power generation costs are calculated as 11.9 yen/kWh for hydroelectric power, 5.3 
yen/kWh for nuclear power, 5.7 yen/kWh for coal thermal power, 6.2 yen/kWh for LNG 
thermal power and 10.7 yen/kWh for oil thermal power (capacity factor is 80% for both 
nuclear and thermal powers) 
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Table 2  Nuclear Cycle Cost Calculation Results (unit: yen/kWh) 
  40 years operation 16 years operation
Uranium fuel  0.59  0.59 
MOX fuel  0.07  0.08 
(Front-end subtotal)  0.66  0.67 
Reprocessing (including transportation) 0.50  0.65 
HLW storage/transportation/disposal  0.15  0.15 
TRU processing/storage/disposal  0.09  0.09 
Decommissioning of reprocessing plant  0.03  0.07 
Interim storage (including transportation)  0.04  0.04 
(Back-end subtotal)  0.81  0.99 
(Fuel cycle total)  1.47  1.66 
 
Table 2  Power Generation Cost Calculation Results (unit: yen/kWh) 
Generation type  Capacity factor  40 years operation  Statutory useful life
operation 
Hydro power  45%  11.9  11.9 
Coal thermal power 30%  16.5  21.1 
〃  70% 11.2 13.2 
〃  80% 10.7 12.4 
LNG thermal power 60% 6.8  8.1 
〃  70% 6.5  7.6 
〃  80% 6.2  7.2 
Coal thermal power 70%  6.2  8.1 
〃  80% 5.7  7.4 
Nuclear power  70%  5.9  8.2 
〃  80% 5.3  7.4 
〃  85% 5.1  7.0 
 
The Cost Examination Subcommittee analyzed the calculation results by changing 
various set preconditions such as the period of operation, capacity factor, exchange rate, 
the rate of increase of fuel prices, discount rate and comparing them with the previous 
government cost calculations in 1999. 
The subcommittee said that the generation cost of nuclear power has remained the 
cheapest when the period of operation is 40 years, capacity factor is 80% and the IEEJ: April 2009 
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discount rate is equal to or more than 1%.   
The subcommittee also said that coal thermal power is on par with nuclear power 
at the discount rate of 3% and is cheaper than nuclear power at the discount rate equal 
to or less than 2% when the period of operation is the statutory useful life. However, the 
subcommittee stated that this represents a minimal difference in cost between coal 
power and nuclear power in this case.   
As for LNG thermal power, the subcommittee referred to the previous calculation in 
1999 which showed that LNG thermal power was cheaper than nuclear power at any 
discount rates when the period of operation is the statutory useful life, capacity factor is 
80%. Then the subcommittee added that, though the calculation this time shows the 
same results, the difference in cost between LNG thermal power and nuclear power is 
narrowed.  
The subcommittee concluded that there is no need to change the previous 
evaluation that nuclear power is by no means inferior to other methods of power 
generation according to the analysis and evaluation results of the profitability of 
nuclear power generation as a whole. 
 
3. Economic Evaluation of Nuclear Power Generation by the U.S. Government: 
Importance of Discount Rate 
As mentioned above, the cost of nuclear power generation is calculated to be a little 
lower than other power generation methods in Japan when the period of operation is 40 
years. However, a different result is given by the cost calculation in the United States. 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in the U.S. Congress publicized the cost 
calculation in May 2008 as the latest analysis by a U.S. governmental organization. In a 
reference scenario of CBO’s calculation which excludes any policy support to power 
generation, the power generation costs of conventional coal and natural gas thermal 
power are US$55/MWh and US$57/MWh respectively, while that of nuclear power is 
US$72/MWh and about 30% higher than those of thermal energies (CBO also calculated 
the cost of innovative coal and natural gas powers with “carbon capture and storage” 
(CCS). Here those results have been omitted). 
It will be worthwhile to ascertain where this difference in nuclear power 
generation cost calculation in each country originates because it will lead us to the 
factor which determines the economics of nuclear power generation. Mr. Yuji Matsuo 
and colleagues at the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, analyzed the difference 
between the Japanese Government’s calculation and that of U.S. CBO. In order to 
compare with Japan’s 2004 analysis, Matsuo et al. adjusted the cost calculation of CBO IEEJ: April 2009 
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to the 2002 year price level by using the gross domestic product (GDP) deflator and 
converting it into Japanese yen at the exchange rate of 122 yen/US$. They obtained 
comparable numerical values as follows: in the CBO’s Reference scenario, 7.8 yen/kWh 
for nuclear power, 6.0 yen/kWh for coal thermal, and 6.2 yen/kWh for natural gas 
thermal. The differences between Japan and U.S. are small in coal and natural gas 
thermal power, but large in nuclear power. Nuclear power is still expensive according to 
the U.S. calculations. 
 
Table 3    Comparison of calculation results by Japan and the U.S. (2002 yen price) 
 (unit:  yen/kWh) 




Japan’s Cost Exam. Subcom. 
(Discount rate 3%, Capacity 
factor 80%) 
5.3 5.7 6.2 
U.S. CBO Reference scenario 7.8  6.0  6.2 
 
Matsuo et al. searched for the factor which can explain the difference between 
Japan and the U.S. and found that there were no great differences in the unit 
construction cost of the nuclear plant which is slightly more expensive in Japan than in 
the U.S. They also found that front-end costs and back-end costs in the nuclear fuel 
cycle are a little higher in Japan because spent fuels are reprocessed in Japan. The 
difference in the discount rate is thought to be a major factor generating a cost 
difference between Japan and the U.S.; investor's expected rate of return is assumed to 
be 14% for stocks and 8% for debts in the U.S. while the discount rate is assumed to be 
only 3% in Japan. If the discount rate is reduced to 3%, the costs of power generation 
will be 3.5 yen/kWh for nuclear, 3.6 yen/kWh for coal thermal and 5.2 yen/kWh for 
natural gas thermal, according to U.S. CBO calculations. If we assume a discount rate 
of 3%, power generation costs in the U.S. will be lower than in Japan and nuclear power 
will be cheaper than other types even in the U.S. It can be said that the deference in 
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Table 4    Comparison of calculation results by Japan and the U.S. (2002 yen price) 
(unit: yen/kWh) 




Japan’s Cost Exam. Subcom. 
(Discount rate 3%, Capacity 
factor 80%) 
5.3 5.7 6.2 
U.S. CBO Reference scenario 7.8  6.0  6.2 
U.S. CBO Reference scenario 
adjusted by the discount rate of 
3% 
3.5 3.6 5.2 
 
In the 2005 international comparative survey by NEA and IEA of OECD, it was also 
brought to light that the impact the discount rate has on power generation costs greatly 
varies among each power generation method. In all OECD member countries and three 
non-member countries (Bulgaria, Romania and South Africa), power generation costs 
were within the range of roughly US$21~31/MWh for nuclear, roughly US$25~50/MWh 
for coal thermal and roughly US$37~60/MWh for natural gas thermal, under an 
assumed discount rate of 5%. Under an assumed discount rate of 10%, the cost will 
increase to roughly US$30~50/MWh for nuclear, US$35~60/MWh for coal thermal and 
US$40~63/MWh for natural gas thermal. The increase in cost for nuclear power 
generation will be most significant, since the weight of capital investment is high thus 
making power generation costs for nuclear power plants also high. 
The bank interest rate has a dominating influence over the discount rate. Though 
there are various arguments among economists how the bank interest rate level will be 
decided in each country, a general observation is that when an economy is undergoing 
rapid growth, its investment demand is vigorous and its interest rate tends to be high 
while when an economy is stagnant, its investment demand is sluggish and its interest 
rate tends to be low. If this is true, nuclear power generation might be uneconomical and 
at a disadvantage in newly emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil. 
Nuclear power might also be at a disadvantage in advanced countries whose economy is 
in the expanding phase. 
 
4. The Uncertainty of Fossil Fuel Prices 
If the interest rate level is high and nuclear power generation becomes 
disadvantageous to the newly emerging countries undergoing rapid economic growth IEEJ: April 2009 
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and the advanced countries experiencing an economic boom, other forms of large-scale 
power generation, that is to say, coal-fired thermal power and gas thermal power will 
inevitably expand to meet the power demand that increases along with economic growth 
and the economic boom. 
However, the expansion of such fossil fuel thermal power generation will bring 
about a rise in fossil fuel prices sooner or later. The change in the fuel prices will cause 
power generation costs to fluctuate. The aforementioned CBO report demonstrated that 
the sensitivity of cost to fuel prices greatly differs depending on the power generation 
method. When fuel costs double, an increase in the power generating costs of nuclear 
power remains at around 11% while the costs of coal thermal and natural gas thermal 
increase by about 27% and 70% respectively. 
The CBO report assumed the fuel price for coal power plant to be US$1.74 /million 
Btu, which is equivalent to US$46.3/t in terms of Australian steam coal with 6,700 kcal. 
As Australian steam coal was around US$80/t in fiscal 2008, the actual coal price was 
73% higher than the assumed value. If the abovementioned sensitivity analysis is 
applied, the power generation costs of coal thermal would increase by about 20% (27%×
73/100) to US$66/MWh. Even if the cost of the nuclear fuel cycle increases by the same 
ratio as coal prices (73%), the cost of nuclear power generation would increase by only 
8% (11%×73/100) and remain at US$78/MWh narrowing the cost gap between coal 
thermal and nuclear. If natural gas prices increase by the same ratio as coal prices, the 
cost of natural gas thermal would increase by 51% (70%×73/100) to US$86/MWh and 
become more expensive than nuclear power. 
The survey by NEA and IEA also described sensitivity analyses. According to the 
survey, doubled fuel prices will bring about a hike in power generation costs with about 
a 40% increase for coal thermal and about a 75% increase for natural gas thermal, while 
doubled Uranium fuel prices will only cause a 4% increase in nuclear power generation 
costs. Of course, not only Uranium ore prices but also fuel processing costs should be 
doubled in order to establish a proper comparison with fossil fuels, as the period for 
processing for Uranium ore into nuclear fuel is long in the case of nuclear power 
generation. However, even if the total cost of the nuclear fuel cycle is doubled, the cost of 
nuclear power generation will increase by only 15%. In short, OECD member countries 
on average are more sensitive to fossil fuel price fluctuations than in the U.S. 
The experiences of the past year have taught us how drastic fluctuations in oil and 
other fossil fuel prices are and how difficult it can be to forecast them. Not only an 
actual supply-demand situation but also the influence of speculation has been pointed 
out as a cause of price fluctuations.   IEEJ: April 2009 
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It is understood though that the earth will someday run out of fossil fuels 
eventually. The price of fossil fuels will no doubt soar the closer they reach the point of 
total depletion. At what stage near total depletion shall price start to soar? Even if 
nuclear power generation has become economical at that stage, will it be possible to fill 
in the fossil fuel gap in time? 
Saying "In the long run, we are all dead”, John Maynard Keynes criticized classical 
economists and pointed out that, even if a macroeconomic equilibrium is reached in the 
long run, what matters to us are the problems which occur up until that point. Saying 
“In the long run, our fuels will all be exhausted” might prove meaningless with 
forecasting the actual price trends of fossil fuels. Nevertheless, it remains a mystery 
just how much of the future can be foreseen when the market achieves a supply-demand 
equilibrium. 
In the process of thermal power generation, fossil fuel thermal power plants emit 
carbon dioxide, which is regarded as a cause of global warming. Therefore, there is an 
approach which curbs fossil fuel power generation through taxing or charging on carbon 
dioxide emissions. Furthermore, there is an idea to install facilities which capture 
carbon dioxide from these fossil fuel thermal power plants and stores it in deep 
underground or other spaces (“carbon capture and storage” (CCS)). These ideas share 
the same view regarding carbon dioxide emitted through the consumption of fossil fuels 
as “waste” and requiring consumers of fossil fuels to bear the costs of disposing of their 
“waste”. In nuclear power generation, costs for processing and disposing spent fuels are 
often included under nuclear fuel costs in its broader sense. Similarly, carbon 
tax/charges and CCS costs can be included under fossil fuel costs in its broader sense.   
If fossil fuel costs in its broader sense increases due to the introduction of carbon 
tax/charges or CCS, the relative economy of nuclear power generation will improve. The 
U.S. CBO analyzed the impact of carbon tax/charges on the economies of various power 
generation methods and concluded that “Carbon dioxide charges of about $45 per 
metric ton would probably make nuclear generation competitive with conventional 
fossil-fuel technologies”. Even if there is uncertainty about fossil fuel cost 
fluctuations in its narrow sense, an increase in remaining fossil fuel costs in its 
broader sense will reduce its potential impact on the relative economy of nuclear 
power. 
 
5. Regulatory Risk 
Finally, regulatory risk must be cited as an inherent characteristic that greatly 
determines the economics of nuclear power generation   IEEJ: April 2009 
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OECD/NEA pointed out in its recent publications on the economics of nuclear power 
that "the earlier experiences with constructing nuclear power plants has shown that 
there is a kind of inherent risk with nuclear power generation projects that is out of the 
control of the investors and is difficult or might even be impossible for pricing 
commercial funding”, specifically mentioning “those risks include the licensing risks 
(essentially risks which include delay or discontinuance due to barriers in the licensing 
process) ".   
Licensing risks can be called "Regulatory risk" under a slightly broader definition, 
when not only risks in the licensing process of construction phase but also risks in the 
regulatory processes of operation phase and decommissioning phase are included.  
Regulatory risk can exert a big influence on the costs of nuclear power generating 
through the period of operation and the capacity factor.   
For instance, if the future operation period of new nuclear power generation plants 
is limited to a certain number of years, say 32 years by the government, the economics 
of new power plants will be considerably lowered. Strictly speaking, limiting the period 
of operation to virtually 32 years by the German Government as part of its nuclear 
phase-out policy was applied retroactively to existing power plants and therefore is not 
directly relevant to the cost calculations here.   
Furthermore, the capacity factor of nuclear plants in Japan remained at 58.0% in 
2008. One of the main contributing factors for low capacity factor is the prolonged forced 
outage of Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant 
since the occurrence of the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake in July, 2007. While 
the plant cannot operate safely, the outage is inevitable. However, if government 
regulation postpones restarting the plant even after the plant becomes safe to operate 
once again, an even lower capacity factor may result from regulatory risk. Because the 
capacity factor assumed under the cost calculation by the Japanese Government is 80%, 
the economics of nuclear power generation may already have suffered considerably at 
an actual capacity factor of 58%.   
It is hoped that regulatory risk can be decreased by rational and scientific 
judgment, although nuclear power generation safety regulations should be carefully 
applied due to the enormous potential hazard that it can represent.   
 
6. Concluding Remarks: Coping with Three Uncertainties 
Electric utilities companies have to choose one of the power generation methods by 
both expecting that the regulatory risks of nuclear power will be decreased on the one 
hand and on the other hand comparing interest rate forecast and fuel price (especially, IEEJ: April 2009 
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fossil fuel price) forecast. They are exposed to uncertainties both with the interest rate 
and fuel prices. The uncertainty which can be decreased is the uncertainty over the 
interest rate, as that uncertainty disappears if the utility can receive funding through  
long-term liabilities with fixed interest rates.   
In Japan, nuclear power plants continued to be constructed before we entered the 
age of low interest rates since the middle of the 1990's. Therefore, the economy of 
nuclear power was secured. The Development Bank of Japan (DBJ), a 
government-affiliated financial institution, has played an important role in securing the 
economy of nuclear power. DBJ supplied long term finance with fixed interest rates to 
electric utilities for their nuclear power plant constructions as a part of the 
government‘s financial investment and loan programs.   
As the unit construction cost for nuclear power plants is higher than other power 
generation methods and the size and scope of nuclear power plants has become larger 
and larger due to the falling unit construction costs which have arisen in tandem with 
facility size expansion, the size of nuclear power plant funding has become enormous. 
Although the significance of DBJ financing, government investment and bank loans are 
usually explained as its "quantitative side", (i.e. the enormous amount of loans), 
attention must also be paid to its “qualitative side”, (i.e. the ultralong-term fixed 
interest rates which have eliminated the uncertainty of interest rate levels).   
It is often said that the ultralong-term fixed interest rates cannot be offered by 
private financial institutions and that the government-affiliated financial institutions 
have played a supplementary role by supplying ultralong-term fixed rates. However, 
even private financial institutions can offer ultralong-term fixed rates, if they can add 
enough risk premiums on to their interest rates. (Therefore, it might be possible to see 
that these risk premiums are provided as interest rate subsidies by the government‘s 
financial investment and loan programs). 
In the newly emerging countries and advanced countries experiencing an economic 
boom, government financing or government guarantees which decrease the uncertainty 
of interest rate levels will be needed to realize the potential economy of nuclear power.   
If such support by governments needs justification, the externality of nuclear power, 
which bypasses the market function, should be explained.   
The positive externality for coping with uncertainties both in price and amount of 
fossil fuel supplies can be easily understood, but difficult to be quantified. 
Another positive externality to restrain the emission of carbon dioxide by fossil fuel 
power generation can be also easily understood. However, it might be argued that 
internalizing the negative externality of fossil fuel power generation by taxation, by IEEJ: April 2009 
 12
charging on carbon dioxide or by CCS is simpler and more appropriate than government 
subsidies to the positive externality of nuclear power. (It is the argument of increasing 
fossil fuel cost in its broader sense as mentioned above). 
In any case, in order to realize the positive externalities of nuclear power 
generation, the governments should maintain the appropriate capacity of nuclear power 
both by minimizing regulatory risk and influencing the cost structure of power 
generation through government financing or guarantees, carbon dioxide taxation and/or 
other policy tools. Otherwise, it may become difficult to maintain an investment in 
nuclear power generation in many countries other than those with low discount rates 
such as Japan.   
 
 
* The author would like to express his deep appreciation to colleagues at the Institute of 
Energy Economics, Japan, especially Dr. Ken Koyama, Dr. Tatsujiro Suzuki, Mrs. 
Tomoko Murakami and Mr. Yuji Matsuo for their suggestion. However, the opinions 
expressed in this paper are strictly those of the author, and do not necessarily 
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